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INTRODUCTION 
The performance of accelerators with high beam power 
or high stored beam energy is strongly dependent on the 
way the beam is handled, how beam parameters are 
measured and how the machine is commissioned. Two 
corresponding working groups have been organized for 
the Workshop: group C “Beam diagnostics, collimation, 
injection/extraction and targetry” and group G 
“Commissioning strategies and procedures”. It has been 
realized that the issues to be discussed in these groups are 
interlaced with the participants involved and interested in 
the above topics, with an extremely important subject of 
beam-induced accidents as additional topic. Therefore, we 
have decided to combine the group sessions as well as 
this summary report. Status, performance and outstanding 
issues of each the topic are described in the sections 
below, with additional observations and proposals by the 
joint group at the end. 
BEAM INSTRUMENTATION AND 
DIAGNOSTICS 
Successful commissioning and efficient operation of an 
accelerator are clearly related to reliable and trustful beam 
instrumentation and diagnostic. Besides general 
instruments like beam position monitors and beam current 
monitors, high intensity accelerators need dedicated 
diagnostics for this special purpose. This typically 
includes beam profile monitors with the emphasis on halo 
measurements as well as beam loss monitors (BLM) for 
machine protection. Comprehensive descriptions of PSI, 
SNS, HERA and LHC BLM and protection systems were 
discussed during our joined sessions. 
An overview of a complete set of instruments for the J-
PARC accelerator complex was given by N. Hayashi (J-
PARC), illustrating the complex needs of diagnostic 
instruments in the different stages of a high intensity 
accelerator chain: 
Beam Position Monitor (BPM) 
• normal BPMs in Main Ring: 186 shoebox type with 
large diameter, 130 - 377 mm; 
• 324-MHz BPM: sensitivity at Linac frequency, 
useful for painting studies. 
Beam Current Monitor 
• DCCT: Bergoz type, frequency range DC to 10 kHz, 
dynamic range 150 mA-15 A; 
• beam current transformers SCT, MCT (0.5-ms 
injection process monitor), and FCT (RF feedback 
control); 
• wall current monitor for RF feed-forward control; 
Profile Monitor 
• multi-wire: destructive monitor, used for 
commissioning (single pass) beam; 
• Ionization Profile Monitor (IPM): extended high gain 
MCPs in halo region of beam; 
• Gas Sheet Profile Monitor;  
• Beam Loss Monitor (BLM): Main Ring  > 300 
• scintillator+PMT: fast response; but degraded with 
large loss, radiation damage; 
• proportional chamber type: Ar+CO2(1%); 
• air-filled ionization chamber: slow response 
(~1msec); stable. 
Others 
• quadrupole pickup monitor: successful tests at KEK-
PS with 4 electrode pick-up; 
• wire scanner: rotating flying wire at KEK-PS, speed 
of 20 m/s to survive in high-intensity beam; 
• SEM grids: installed at beam transfer and 
injection/extraction lines, little destructive, has to 
survive high level radiation, still looking for good 
wire material; 
• Coherent Tune Monitor: conventional; exciter 
system: a pair of stripline electrodes; dedicated 
BPM: quad parallel electrodes. 
   
  A typical problem of high-intensity accelerators is the 
high dynamic range. The instruments must work with 
low-intensity beams during commissioning as well as for 
high intensity. Especially the transversal beam profile 
monitors require a very high dynamic range when using 
for transversal beam halo measurements. An overview 
was given by K.Wittenburg (DESY) about recent non-
destructive beam profile and halo monitors with the focus 
on the dynamic range. The techniques used for transverse 
and longitudinal halo measurements are as follows. 
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Transversal Halo: 
• Wire scanners, still “state-of-the-art” instruments for 
very high dynamic range up to 108. Different 
successful readouts: logarithmic amplifiers, counting 
schemes with telescope detectors or the “vibrating-
wire” technique. 
• Synchrotron Radiation (SR) with coronagraph has 
potential (dynamic range 106 to 107), but limited to 
high-energy beams (HERA, LHC and Tevatron).  
• IPM and LPM sufficient for profiles but with some 
background issues for halo. Dynamic range ≈ 103. A 
new idea to overcome this limitation is under 
development at J-PARC. 
• Laser-based profile monitor works well for H- beams 
at SNS. Also suitable for bunch length measurement. 
Dynamic range ≈ 103.  
• Electron beam technique (E-Probe) for profile 
determination still under development. Not intended 
for beam halo measurements so far. Dynamic range 
< 102. 
Longitudinal Halo (“Beam-in-Gap”): 
• SR with high potential, but limited to high energy.  
• Temporal beam loss distribution measurements are 
very sensitive but applicable in transversal halo only, 
therefore with larger uncertainty. 
• Extended IPM for bunch length measurement still 
under development (GSI), but useful for all energies 
and all hadron beams. Might also be useful for Beam 
in Gap studies? 
  
An Optical Transition Radiation (OTR) detector for 
beam profile monitoring of intense proton and antiproton 
beams at Fermilab was presented by Vic Scarpine 
(FNAL). Thin foils were used to minimize beam 
scattering since OTR is a surface phenomenon. 
Commercial imaging technologies, especially radiation-
hardened CID cameras were used to acquire the beam 
information. OTR has the advantage that the image can 
provide 2-D information on various parameters like: 
transverse profile and shape (tilt), transverse position, 
emittance, intensity, divergence, energy, and even 3-D 
information like bunch length and longitudinal profiles. 
Initial prototype measurements indicate that OTR 
detectors can be suitable profile monitors for powerful 
beams, although more studies of foil damaging are still 
necessary. 
A very detailed study of the correction of unevenness in 
Recycler longitudinal beam profile was presented by K.Y. 
Ng (FNAL). The sources of the uneven profile were 
identified by RF voltage imperfection and beam loading 
of just a few volts. A compensation of the unevenness of 
the beam profile has been successfully performed and an 
automation of the compensation procedure has been 
designed and is being built, hoping that the compensation 
could be performed in the future just by pushing a button. 
Philippe Legou (Saclay) gave a description of a new 
high-rate charged particle detector which is used as a 
beam spectrometer for the NA48II experiment. It 
measures precisely the kinematics characteristics of 
particles at a rate of 20 MHz with minimum amount of 
material in the beam. The performance of this detector is 
very good and no damage after two years of running was 
observed even at that high repetition rate with a very low 
cost realization (printed circuit board technology).  
During our discussion sessions we focused on two 
topics, namely: 
Which systems are most important for initial 
commissioning? 
• At SNS: BPMs, Current Monitor, Loss Monitors. 
• Screens or harps in Linacs and transport lines. 
• BPMs in intensity mode useful for first turn(s) 
threading. 
How does one "guarantee" working diagnostic systems on 
day one? 
• Tests in advance, dry runs with all triggers and test 
signals + software. 
• SNS: Used dry runs; after that, 2 beam shots proofed 
that all instruments are working. 
BEAM COLLIMATION AND TARGETRY 
High-power machines tend to be limited by beam 
losses, not by current limitations. It is a mandatory 
nowadays at high-power accelerators and high-energy 
colliders to concentrate beam losses at a few locations 
with collimators. Nikolai Mokhov (FNAL) gave an 
introductory talk on the subject “High-intensity beam 
collimation and targetry”. The purpose of a collimation 
system is to protect components against excessive 
irradiation, minimize backgrounds in the experiments, 
maintain operational reliability over the life of the 
machine (quench stability among other things), provide 
acceptable hands-on maintenance conditions and reduce 
the impact of radiation on environment. Both normal 
operation and accidental conditions (abort kicker prefire 
etc.) have to be considered.  
Practically all the collimation systems these days are 
two-stage ones. For each plane, they consist of a primary 
thin scattering target, followed by a few secondary 
collimators (scrapers) at the appropriate phase advances in 
the lattice. The purpose of a thin target is to increase the 
amplitude of the betatron oscillations of the halo particles 
and thus to increase their impact parameter on the scraper 
face on the next turns. This results in a significant 
decrease of the outscattered proton yield, total beam loss 
in the accelerator and scraper jaws overheating, as well as 
in mitigating requirements to scraper alignment. Besides 
that, the scraper efficiency becomes almost independent of 
accelerator tuning, there is only one significant but totally 
controllable restriction of accelerator aperture and only the 
scraper region needs heavy shielding and a dogleg 
structure. The system is built with corresponding design 
and engineering constraints in mind, satisfying 
appropriate radiation limits. Performance of the existing 
systems is quite impressive, in agreement with results of 
detailed sophisticated simulations, including recent 
achievements at the Tevatron with bent crystal 
collimation. Another novel approach is to use marble as a 
collimator shielding outer shell to substantially reduce 
residual activation. 
Stefano Redaelli (CERN) considered in his talk “The 
LHC beam collimation” how the multi-stage halo 
cleaning system is designed, prototyped and built to deal 
with a 350-MJ 7-TeV proton beam. The system occupies 
two out of eight warm insertions for momentum (IR3) and 
betatron (IR7) cleaning, with local cleaning upstream of 
the interaction regions. It consists of one hundred 
collimators (primary, secondary, shower absorbers, 
tertiary, etc) with 500 degrees of freedom total. The 
proposed robust collimation system (Phase-I) can’t 
achieve the nominal beam intensity because of reduced 
efficiency and large impedance (small gaps, large 
resistivity are expected to lead to beam instabilities). 
R&D is underway on high-Z collimator materials for the 
Phase-II system. 
Brennan Goddard (CERN) in his talk “Safe disposal of 
the LHC beams by extraction onto the beam dumping 
blocks” described a sophisticated system to protect the 
LHC machine, including unsynchronized beam aborts. 
Eva Barbara Holzer and Stefano Redaelli (CERN) 
discussed LHC BLM and collimation system 
commissioning (see section below). 
For the collimation systems to be efficient, one needs 
good orbit control (automatic feedback) – to define loss 
locations. BLMs are as important as BPMs. It is a modern 
approach for accelerator complexes like LHC and J-PARC 
to build a realistic model of the machine for multi-turn 
beam loss, energy deposition and activation studies: read 
in MAD lattice, create complete geometry and magnetic 
field model with modern FLUKA / MARS / GEANT. The 
experience says it takes time and substantial efforts but 
always pays off. 
The most important targetry issues - aimed at design of 
high-efficiency target systems and achieving their best 
performance – have been considered in Nikolai’s talk 
described at the beginning of this section. Current R&D 
on the neutrino experiment graphite targets and neutrino 
factory mercury jet targets was described. Nikolai gave 
also a talk on behalf of Nick Simos (BNL) “Experimental 
studies of targets and collimators for high-intensity 
beams”. Impressive results of beam tests with collimator 
and target materials were presented, including recent 
findings of self-annealing in 2D carbon-carbon 
composites for LHC collimators. Features of a “dream 
material” were described to get us to multi-MW beam 
power levels: 
• low elasticity modulus; 
• low thermal expansion; 
• high heat capacity; 
• good diffusivity to move heat away from hot spots; 
• high strength;  
• resilience to shock/fracture strength; 
• resilience to irradiation damage. 
Alexander Ryazanov (RRC) described “Shock wave 
propagation near 7-TeV proton beam in LHC collimation 
materials”. 
INJECTION/EXTRACTION 
Beam loss for injection and extraction of the 
synchrotron ring is a crucial part for a high-intensity 
proton machine. M. Tomizawa (KEK) reviewed the beam 
loss mechanisms related to linac-to-ring injection, ring-to-
ring injection, one-turn extraction and slow extraction by 
showing the J-PARC as an example. Beam loss 
performance of injection/extraction obtained by the 
existing machines was discussed in the working session. 
The fraction of proton beam lost at slow extraction from 
existing machines (KEK PS, CERN PS and SPS, BNL 
AGS and FNAL MI) ranges from 1 to 20% that 
corresponds to beam loss power of 0.4 to 3 kW. The 
design goal for J-PARC is 0.25% beam loss or 2 kW of 
beam loss power.  
  M. Giovannozzi (CERN) presented the design and tests 
results of a novel multi-turn ejection from the CERN PS 
to the SPS. This extraction technique enables to transfer 
from the PS to the SPS with beam loss smaller than the 
present scheme. 
  The loss rates at H- injection were discussed. 
Development of long-lived charge exchange foils is one 
of the key issues for high-intensity beam injection into 
proton rings. I. Sugai (KEK) showed performance of the 
HBC foil (hybrid type thick boron doped carbon foil), 
which has been developed by himself. They examined life 
time of HBC foils with thickness of 200-380 µg/cm2 by 
using 3.3 MeV, 3 µA-Ne beam. Maximum life time 
achieved was 9800 mC/cm2, which is roughly 400 times 
longer than commercially available foils. Less shrinkage 
due to beam irradiation was also observed.  The beam test 
using 700 keV H- is underway.  T. Spickermann (LANL) 
reported results of beam tests of nanocrystalline 
DIAMOND foil which is being used for the PSR charge 
injection. A 450 µg/cm2 thick nanocrystalline endured 
beam irradiation comparable with life time of LANL 
foils. Lifetime tests of the nanocrystalline DIAMOND 
foils are continued.  
   M. Shirakata (KEK) examined effects on the injected 
beam of nonlinear field in a large-aperture quadrupole 
magnet and of field interference between shift bump 
magnets and adjacent other magnets in the J-PARC RCS. 
Significant emittance growth by these effects was not 
seen, but foil hitting probability by the circulating beam is 
increased. 
BEAM-INDUCED ACCIDENTS 
As a part of the session, machine protection issues were 
discussed and some beam “accidents” were presented in 
detail, especially why they occurred although a protection 
system should have prevented accidents. 
Nikolai Mokhov (FNAL) gave a description of the 
“Beam-induced damage to the Tevatron components and 
what has been done about it”: 
• beam accident at Tevatron on December 5, 2003; 
• detailed analysis of the sequence of events that led to 
damage; 
• beam dynamics during the quench development; 
• energy deposition in collimators; 
• ablation of tungsten collimator; 
• BLM and other system changes to prevent future 
accidents. 
The initial reason of the large quench was found to be 
caused by a CDF Roman Pot reinserting itself back into 
the beam after it had been issued retract commands. The 
Roman Pot motion control hardware has since then been 
found to be faulty. This event prompted an investigation 
in order to describe the sequence of events to understand 
the damage imposed on the collimator devices. Analysis 
of the quench data and collimator damage along with 
dynamic simulations of misbehaved beam, energy 
deposition and ablation process in the collimators, have 
provided an explanation of the damage of Tevatron 
components, with good agreement with observations. 
Note that there was a strategy adopted many years ago 
when collider operation began it was better to run without 
the BLM’s during a store to prevent accidental aborts 
from uncritical losses. After the event, the strategy was 
examined and changed. The biggest change made was the 
implantation of a new fast detection buffer inside the 
Quench Protection Monitor system that samples quench 
data at 5 kHz and determines a quench and pulls the abort 
in 2 msec instead of the 16 msec before the change. New 
BLM’s, kicker AC and UPS systems, vacuum interfaces, 
and controls were designed and the system was 
documented at every level and captured in the Accelerator 
Division document database.  
Kay Wittenburg (DESY) gave a survey of the “Very 
fast beam losses at HERA and what has been done about 
it”. The HERA BLM system has an integration time 
constant of 5.2 ms, therefore beam losses on a faster time 
scale were not covered by this system while for losses on 
longer time scales the system efficiently protects the 
machine. Two typical scenarios were discussed.  
First, mislead beam due to misfired kickers, machine 
not ready for injection, operation etc. These events are 
typically as fast as one turn. If such an event happens, no 
active protection system will be able to protect the 
machine and safe operation relies on beam absorbers at 
the correct location. Safe operation also requires reliable 
fast kicker systems.  
Second, after an equipment failure (e.g., power supply 
trip) the beam starts to oscillate (position or size) with 
exponentially growing amplitude. Beam losses occur after 
a time that depends on the failure type and the beam can 
be lost within a very short time. Especially some power 
supplies at locations with very high β-functions were 
discovered to cause very fast losses on time scales of less 
than 5 ms. For this reason, new and improved active 
interlocks were added to the HERA machine protection 
system: 
• the beam current decay rate is measured and a 
threshold was set to trigger a beam dump. In 
combination with BLM system both, fast and slow 
beam losses can be handled now very effectively; 
• the internal power supply alarms were improved to a 
delay of less than 100 µs; 
• the whole interlock system of HERA was made 
faster, including the electronics of the interlocks 
system and the electronics of the beam dumping 
system; 
• monitors to detect fast magnet current changes were 
developed and installed for all critical electrical 
circuits. 
All systems together efficiently reduced the numbers of 
dangerous losses (e.g. quenches) and no false beam dump 
triggers happened up to now.  
Brennan Goddard (CERN) discussed the “Transfer line 
damage during high-intensity proton beam extraction 
from the SPS in 2004” with the main question of why the 
machine protection was inadequate. By means of a 
detailed study of the event, some interlock logic 
shortcomings were detected. The interlock system cannot 
detect any failure of a power converter in a window of 
about 5 ms before extraction. Some EMC problems, 
which became apparent when the beam intensity was 
increased, led to a septum power supply trip in during this 
time that was not detected. The beam was still extracted 
and damaged the vacuum pipe and a quadrupole magnet. 
A list of contributing factors was given: 
• lack of preparation for high-intensity beam 
commissioning of extraction; no high-intensity 
commissioning procedures established → crucial 
steps were overlooked or ignored; 
• inadequate acceptance tests of machine protection 
system (interlock and surveillance systems working 
together with equipment) without and with beam; 
• insufficient understanding of risks: problems with 
the fast current decay monitoring of septum and 
EMC pick-up, which could have detected and solved 
without extracting beam; 
• incorrect interlock logic – detected fault should 
always inhibit the beam first, before cutting the 
equipment (was requested but not implemented); 
• high-intensity commissioning and beam tests were 
‘simultaneous’, with no clear separation in terms of 
preparation, procedures, people, time, objectives and 
responsibility; 
• delays and equipment problems reduced the time 
available for extraction commissioning and increased 
pressure to deliver high-intensity beam, at an 
unfavorable time very late in evening (16h into the 
test); 
• problems which occurred (noise-induced trips, 
measuring bumped beam) were not solved before 
continuing to increase beam intensity – and were still 
present with full intensity. 
The following improvements were implemented for 
2006: 
• commissioning to be carefully prepared (procedures, 
tests and commissioning steps); 
• full formal acceptance tests of machine protection 
system defined and performed;  
• “strapping” or by-passing of interlocks rendered 
impossible for high beam intensities; LHC-style 
interlocking has been implemented in SPS, with safe 
beam and interlock masking concept to allow 
flexibility in operation with low intensity beam; 
• changes to pre-defined settings only possible by 
experts following agreed procedure, for example, 
after repeating a subset of acceptance tests with 
beam; 
• problems encountered with critical systems to be 
solved before continuing; 
• for high intensity, machine protection must take 
priority over efficiency; 
• fixed conceptual problem with interlock from septum 
PLC by adding direct link to beam interlock system, 
with 10-ms delay on interlock to power supply; 
• reduced the delay in SW surveillance to ~2 ms 
before extraction; 
• added direct “sum fault” interlock from power 
supplies to beam interlock; 
• added (HERA) Fast Current Change Monitors to 14 
critical electrical circuits including the extraction 
septum magnet. 
Pierre Schmelzbach (PSI) gave a detailed presentation 
about “Experience with high-power operation of the PSI 
proton accelerator facility”, discussing the danger of such 
high-power machine and a list of countermeasures: 
• avoid wrong settings: HW-windows on power 
supplies, correlated settings; 
• fast diagnostics to detect critical situations; 
• passive protection (collimators); 
• beam loss monitors; 
• current monitors for transmission; 
• beam centring by BPMs, Harps, heated sieve. 
Even with a good protection strategy, thermal damage 
happened in the machine due to a defect of a high level 
interlock module. 
 
In the discussion session the important questions were 
summarized. First, “What has been done about these 
accidents? 
• all accidents were analysed very detailed; 
• causes and consequences are well understood (lot of 
work); 
• many weak points that could have led to accidents 
were identified and fixed (the weak points were not 
always related to the accident) ; 
• fast detection of failures is clearly required, in the 
order of a few turns, many milliseconds are not 
enough; 
• machine protection issues were very much discussed, 
this is clearly an issue of common interest; 
• tools for data recording and analysis are vital (“post 
mortem”). 
Second, a comprehensive discussion of beam accidents 
had followed the talks with topics on: 
• Damage levels. Note that at the Tevatron and HERA, 
2-3 MJ beams are manageable, while a LHC pilot 
beam at 7 TeV is dangerous at 10 kJ. 
• BLM thresholds and quench levels: 
• How to use BLMs and how to optimize their 
thresholds? 
• How to define original threshold values? 
• How often did one change threshold values? 
• How did one change them technically and 
conceptually? Safe and Fast? Remote? 
• Time integration, is it really necessary to have so 
many windows as suggested for LHC?  
• BLM settings, response, sensitivity, Monte Carlo 
calculations. 
• Injection beam losses at different machines. 
• Dump kicker issues. 
• Loss power on dump behind stripping foil. 
• Stripping foil lifetimes. 
• Post Mortem analysis of beam events. 
• Reliability and availability studies - do we believe 
the results? 
BEAM COMMISSIONING 
Commissioning issues were thoroughly considered for 
existing machines and accelerators under construction. 
Bob Zwaska (FNAL) “Commissioning of the Fermilab 
NuMI Neutrino Beam”: Machine protection, groundwater 
protection and precision beam are all important issues. 
The beam permit system has several functions: 
• routinely inhibits beam when components fail; 
• prevents extraction when magnets fail and do not 
have the correct currents; 
• prevents extraction when beam is in the abort gap; 
• inhibits beam on unusual behavior, e.g., orbit 
movement. 
John Galambos (ORNL) “SNS commissioning 
strategies and tuneup algorithms”:  
• first proton superconducting linac, uncertain output 
energy – need flexibility; 
• heavy use of high level applications: ~40 integrated 
with online modeling were developed for 
commissioning (physicists wrote the applications); 
• preparation and testing of applications, control 
system, diagnostics allowed rapid beam 
commissioning. 
John Galambos (ORNL) “Beam loss management and 
machine protection in beam commissioning” discussed 
BLM and MPS requirements: 
• fast loss: (determine thresholds during 
commissioning, fault studies) 20 µsec Detect-to-
Beam Inhibit time; 
• slow loss: (corrected for baseline, noise, and x-ray 
background); low level loss: "Soft" alarm through 
network and software trips for 10 second average 
after waveform correction; 
• flexibility - SNS has been commissioned in phases, 
MPS configuration has to be flexible and reliable; 
• reliability – the Machine Protection System must 
inhibit the beam when required; it must fail in a 
SAFE state; 
• availability – the machine availability should be as 
high as possible; the MPS must be easy to configure 
and have a “friendly” operator interface; false trips 
must be minimized; 
• linac loss level and MPS trip level determination 
(BLM calibration approach): calculate neutron yield 
and fault study. 
Dong-o Jeon (ORNL) “The SNS linac commissioning-
comparison of measurement and model” pointed out that  
beam halo is a concern: 
• a new halo mechanism was experimentally verified 
through emittance measurements; 
• the proposed “round beam optics” improves beam 
quality, reducing rms emittance and halo; 
• beam loss reduced in the downstream linac; 
• phase scan technique and acceptance scan technique 
were benchmarked; 
• commissioning demonstrated the validity of the 
model and revealed the shortfall of the model as 
well.  
Tadashi Koseki (KEK) presented “Commissioning 
scenarios for the J-PARC accelerator complex” and 
Masanori Ikegami (KEK) presented “Commissioning 
strategies for J-PARC linac and L3BT”. To minimize 
activation of the accelerator components, tuning is started 
with low beam intensities, and beam transportation to a 
proper dump should be established, and then fine tuning 
procedures are performed. Two years of beam 
commissioning of J-PARC accelerator complex will start 
in December 2006: 
• Linac: two stages beginning Dec 2006; 
• RCS: two stages beginning Sept. 2007; 
• Main Ring: three stages beginning May 2008. 
Plans include substantial pre-beam hardware checkout 
and testing. Thorough commissioning plans are 
developed. Commissioning results from Linac and RCS 
are expected by HB2008. 
Jan Uythoven (CERN) “Safe LHC beam 
commissioning”: with the LHC 7-TeV proton beam with 
energy of 360 MJ stored in one beam, the commissioning 
of the MPS will play a very important role throughout the 
LHC commissioning period to avoid damage to the 
machine components and quenching of superconducting 
magnets and minimize down time. Overall unsafety of the 
core of the MPS has been calculated to be 2.3x10-4 / year.  
Eva Barbara Holzer (CERN) “Commissioning and 
operational scenarios of the LHC beam loss monitor 
system”: Thorough analysis of beam loss duration and 
corresponding protection systems was performed. Beam 
losses and protection strategies are classified according to 
the time scale: 
• ultra-fast losses → passive components (PC) for 
protection; 
• fast losses (4 turns, 356 µs) → PC, protection 
collimators, BLM (damage and quench prevention); 
• intermediate losses (~10 ms) → PC, BLM, quench 
protection system (QPS); 
• slow losses (~10 s) → PC, BLM, QPS; 
• steady state losses → PC, QPS (cryogenic system 
capability). 
The BLM is the only system for quench prevention and 
the main system for damage protection in the time 
window of 4 turns to 10 ms. Beam abort channel over 
threshold needs a very high reliability (tolerable failure 
rate 10-7 per hour per channel). The hardware 
commissioning is well defined. Steps for initial threshold 
determination are defined (simulation and measurements). 
An open question is the management and changing of 
threshold tables: 1.4 million (4000 * 32 * 11) threshold 
values need to be taken into account. 
Stefano Redaelli (CERN) “Commissioning of the LHC 
collimation system”: The beam cleaning system achieves 
the required cleaning vs. beam intensity on paper.   
Staged commissioning without compromising machine 
protection is proposed. A reduced system for initial LHC 
operation with relaxed positioning tolerance will be used. 
The proposed scenarios are validated with detailed 
simulations. The setup of a prototype collimator was 
successfully achieved at the SPS. Centering to the 50 µm 
level was routinely achieved. The methods to adjust the 
collimator gaps were worked out.  
For LHC operation, several questions remain: Can we 
infer the settings at 7 TeV from setup at 450 GeV? How 
do we ensure a correct relative retraction of many 
collimators at different places? What is the expected halo 
population of the LHC beams? How to precisely setup 
skew collimators? 
Brennan Goddard (CERN) “Safe disposal of the LHC 
beams by extraction onto the beam dumping blocks”: The 
LHC beam dump is a critical system for machine 
protection. Safety has been built into the design from the 
start. “Risks” are inherent in using pulsed kicker magnet 
systems. To limit the risks, conventional technological 
choices have been used with large redundancy, 
monitoring and failsafe components. Areas for concern 
are known and will be checked in commissioning. 
Reliability analysis was useful tool for finding 
weaknesses. It is recalled that a trigger is required: “No 
trigger = no dump”! Efforts are now being made to 
ameliorate effects of ‘beyond design’ failures, including 
possible upgrade. An increase dilution might be required 
with more drift length (longer tunnel – very expensive) or 
superconducting quadrupole magnets for further blow-up 
of the beam. For protection against an asynchronous 
dump, sacrificial devices might be an option. 
 
To summarize, the key MPS and commissioning issues 
include: 
• protection versus flexibility in early commissioning; 
• configuration control of MPS parameters, BLM 
thresholds; 
• bypass capabilities and bypass procedures; 
• control of critical parameters (magnet set-points, 
etc.); 
• extremely stringent requirements on MPS 
performance very early in commissioning at LHC; 
• online modeling capabilities, essential for rapid beam 
commissioning progress; 
• importance of “pre-beam” testing and  
“dry-runs” of diagnostics systems, applications 
software, magnet controls, etc. 
PROPOSAL OF WORKSHOP ON 
MATERIALS 
During the presentations and discussions it became 
clear that a better understanding of collimators, targets 
and beam absorbers is in the interest of many labs. For 
CERN, this is driven by the studies on LHC collimators 
and beam absorbers, and on the LHC beam dump block. 
A better understanding is also of interest for the CNGS 
target, for SPS absorbers (extraction protection) and 
transfer line protection collimators. For GSI, targets are 
(or will be) used for Super-FRS, High Energy Density 
experiments and for the production of antiprotons. For 
Fermilab, this is of concern for the Tevatron and Main 
Injector collimation systems, for neutrino production 
targets, for antiproton production targets, for ILC positron 
production targets, for pion production targets and for 
beam absorbers for neutrino factories and muon colliders. 
It was proposed to organize a workshop on these issues, 
probably next spring in Europe. Some of the questions 
that could be addressed are: 
• What are the relevant parameters for beam absorbers 
and targets (such as deposited beam energy, beam 
power, etc)?  
• What materials are being used? What led to the 
choice of these materials? 
• Where are the limits? What are the problems?  
• Future perspectives (as an example, 2nd generation 
beam absorbers for LHC): are there materials that 
can stand the beam impact? 
• Do we require renewable/disposable devices? 
• What happens in case of shock impact (time constant 
~µs)? 
• What happens in case of continuous impact (time 
constant ~second)? 
• What are the relevant physics effects to be 
considered? 
• What are the codes for calculation? 
• When do calculations for shock impact with 
mechanical engineering codes (e.g. ANSYS, 
AUTODYN, …) break down? 
• Compare the results from different codes; possibly 
some simple test cases could be defined. 
• Experimental evidence and experience with 
benchmarking. 
• What happens to the object beyond melting and 
vaporisation temperature? (as an example, beam 
tunneling through materials). 
• What material parameters are relevant? (for example, 
to formulate an equation of state). 
• Are there new materials on the horizon? (e.g., robust 
with low electrical resistance). 
• Short- and long-term effects of radiation? Is there an 
effect of the dose rate? 
• What is the effect of the total dose on material 
properties, and on equation of state? 
• Displacements per atom (dpa) are a quantitative 
measure of the irradiation a material has undergone. 
Is this a universal measure for different radiation 
fields? 
• Is there temperature dependence during radiation? 
What about annealing? 
• What to test and where to test? How to analyse test 
results?  
 
